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Postwar Growth Cycies in the German Economy
Introduction
The conventional definition of business cycies refers to this phenomenon as "recurring but
not periodic" fluctuations found in the aggregate economic activity of aU market oriented
economies1. The National Bureau of Economic Research, which pioneered in the study of
business cycies, quite naturaUy focussed on business cycies in the United States. In the
earliest studies, it was clear that the phenomenon under consideration was common to aU
business enterprise economies, and chronologies were produced many years ago for a
number of countries, including Germany. They covered the years prior to World War II.
The first German chronology produced at the National Bureau is shown in Table 1, and
shows that business cycle peaks and troughs can be discerned for the German economy
weU back into the nineteenth Century.
In our most recent work at the National Bureau we have, in common with many other
students of business cycies, shifted much of our attention from "classical cycies", of the
type shown in Table 1, to "growth cycies", designed to measure recurring alterations in the
rate of economic growth. Particularly after World War II, rapid growth rates oftentimes
were so pronounced that absolute declines in the level ofeconomic activity were quite rare
if not altogether absent. In a pioneering study based on the postwar experience of the
Federal Republic, Dse Mintz showed that recurring alterations in growth rates, based on the
examination of detrended time series, not only provided more cyclical episodes, but that
these episodes had many of the characteristics of classical cycies. She demonstrated that
National Bureau methods for dating cycies could be adapted to the dating ofgrowth cycies.
Mrs. Mintz found four growth cycies in Germany during the period 1950-1967, whereas
only one classical cycle had occurred2.
* The author wishes to thank Geoffrey H.Moore for many constructive suggestions on an earlier draft of this
paper.
1 This perspective is central to the definition of cycies given by Arthur Burns and Wesley Clair Mitchel in Mea¬
suring Business Cycies, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1946. See page 3.
2 use Mintz, Dating Postwar Business Cycies: Methods and Their Application to Western Germany, NBER,
New York 1969.
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1869
1872
Jan. 1882
Jan. 1890
Kar. 1900
Aug. 1903
July 1907
Apr. 1913
June 1918
May 1922
Mar. 1925
Apr. 1929
Table 1: Classical Cycle Chronology for Germany
Peak Trough
1866
1870
Feb 1879
Aug. 1886
Feb. 1895
Mar. 1902
Feb. 1905
Dee. 1908
Aug. 1914
June 1919
Nov. 1923
Mar. 1926
Aug. 1932
Arthur F. Burns and Wesley Clair Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycies,
National Bureau of Economic Research New York, 1947. Table 16, p. 79.
Reprinted in The Business Cycle in a Changing World by Arthur F. Burns,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Nev York, 1969, p. 79.
In 1973, Geoffrey H.Moore and I launched the International Economic Indicators (IEI)
project at the National Bureau. It was designed to build on Mrs. Mintz's seminal work. In
particular we wished to apply traditional National Bureau methods to dating growth cycies
in market-oriented economies and determine whether series equivalent to the National
Bureau's leading indicators of classical cycle turning points for the United States could be
found for other economies and adapted to forecasting growth cycle turning points. We
have thus far tested the system for the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, West Ger¬
many (in a revision and updating of Mrs. Mintz's study), Japan, and more recentiy France
and Italy. Work to date strongly supports an affirmative conclusion to the underlying
hypotheses from which we began.
Dating German Growth Cycies
We have noted that Dse Mintz produced the first German growth cycle chronology. It dealt
with the early postwar period, and the turning points she selected are shown in columns 1
and 2 of Table 2. In columns 3 and 4 we show the most recent and up-to-date growth cycle
116
Table 2: German Growth Cycle Turning Points: Two Assessments
Mint«* i_ib
Lead (-) or
Lag (+) in
Months
Peak
(1)
Trough
(2)
Peak Trough
(3) (4) (3) vs. (1) (4) vs. (2)
4/51
1/56
1/61
1/54
3/59
2/51
2/54
10/55
4/59
2/61
-2
-3
+1
+1
+1
12/65
2/63
1/67
2/63
5/65
8/67
5/70
12/71
8/73
5/75
-7
0
+7
Mean At Peaks: -3
At Troughs:
At Both: 0
+2
Median At Peaks: -2
At Troughs:
At Both: 0
+1
^lse Mintz
to Western
, Dating
Germany,
Postvar Business Cycies, 1
1950-67, National Bureau
Methods and
of Economic
Their Applications
Research, New
York, 1969 p. 25
b
National Bureau of Economic Research, International Economic Indicators
Project.
chronology for Germany produced by our ongoing International Economic Indicator
project. There are discrepancies between Mrs. Mintz's original dates and our present dates
covering the same period. Several reasons account for this. Mrs. Mintz's original data in¬
cluded a mixture of series in physical volume form and series expressed in current prices.
We have concluded that inflation rates have been sufficiently high in many countries (if not
in Germany) that we need to be able to distinguish fluctuations in real economic activity
from the consequences of inflation3. Secondly the analysis of growth cycies requires that
the underlying data be trend adjusted, and Mrs. Mintz's method of adjusting for trend
differed slightly from our present method. FinaUy, the basic series she included in measur¬
ing aggregate economic activity differed somewhat from the series we use. None of these
discrepancies should produce large differences in turning points and the analysis ofthe tim¬
ing comparison included in Table 2 shows that the revisions have not produced large
3 We analyze the latter later in the paper.
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Table 3: Monitoring German Growth Cycies: Growth Turas vs. Production Index Turas,
1951-1978
Index of Industrial Lead (-) or Lag (+)
IEI Production» Trend-Adjusted In Months
Growth Bundesbank IEI Turns
Cycle Turna Turns (2) vs. (1) (3) vs. (1) (2) vs. (3)
(1> (2) (3) w (5) (6)
At Peaks
2/51 4/51
10/55 12/55
2/61 1/61 3/61 -1 +1 -2
5/65 3/65 1/65 -2 -4 +2
5/70 1/70 4/70 -4 -1 -3
8/73 4/73 8/73
3/77
-4 0 -4
Mean Timing -3 -1 -2
Median Timing -3 0 -2
At Troughs
1/54 1/54
4/59 3/59
2/63 2/63 2/63 0 0 0
8/67 4/67 5/67 -4 -3 -1
12/71 11/71 12/71 -1 0 -1
5/75 5/75 7/75
5/78
0 0 -2
Mean Timing -1 -1 -1
Median Timing 0 0 -1
Source: Col. 1 and 3 are the results of IEI calculations. Col. 2 - Statistiche
Beihefte, Deutsches Bundesbank, Reihe 4, Feb. 1979. Estimated from char
on page 40.
differences. (The largest was a seven month difference which occurred twice.) Perhaps
more importantiy, there is perfect conformity in terms of the number of cycies which
emerge.
Our present growth cycle chronology for Germany is, therefore, presented in columns 3
and 4 of Table 2. It is useful before analyzing this chronology further, to compare it with the
current assessment of growth cycies utilized in Germany. For some time the Deutsche
Bundesbank has rehed on the Index of Industrial Production (in trend adjusted form) to ap-
proximate the turning points in German growth cycies. At the National Bureau we have
always avoided rehance on a single indicator, no matter how comprehensive, in deter-
mining business cycle turning points on the grounds that a better balanced chronology can
be obtained by minimizing the possibility that abberations in a single series will unduly in¬
fluence the analysis of aggregate economic activity. In Table 3 we show our current Ger-
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man chronology and compare it with both the German trend-adjusted production index as
weh as with the turning points produced by our own trend adjustment program for the
production index. The comparisons shown in column 6 suggest that the method of trend
adjustment customarily makes little difference, but on several occasions the turning point
in the production index varied by as much as four months depending on how the series was
trend-adjusted. How closely do turns in the trend adjusted production index conform to our
present growth cycle chronology? On average it turns out that our growth cycle troughs
and troughs in the production index (both as adjusted by the IEI project and by the
Bundesbank) are quite close. There was only one case (1967) when other factors intruded
sufficiently to cause us to put the growth cycle trough several months after the turn in the
production index. At peaks, there are more discrepancies. The discrepancies are somewhat
greater between the adjusted Bundesbank production index and our growth peaks than
they are between our adjusted production index and our growth cycle peaks. However, in
neither case are the differences greater than four months. In the next section we shall assess
the growth cycle chronology in the light of ah the indicators, not just the production index.
The relevant data for assessing the Performance of individual indicators at each of the
turning points in the deflated German chronology is presented in Table 4 as weh as ChartL
It is considered in the next section. Here it is worth observing that there wül usually be dis¬
crepancies where individual series exhibit widely separated turning points at the growth cy¬
cle turning points selected. Chart I shows, however, that there are remarkably few skipped
or extra cycies in the seven series. Among the seven, only the disposable income series
reveals a number of extra cycies. The employment series has one. Likewise there are vir¬
tually no skipped cycies, an exception to this being the volume of retail trade at the 1970-71
recession. In short, the conformity of all the series to the selected growth chronology is
high, suggesting that the growth recessions measured were widely diiTused through the
German economy. Diffusion in this sense has always been a significant characteristic of
classical recessions in an economy. The growth recessions are less severe in absolute terms,
but is is apparent that in the case of Germany they were no less widespread in their
manifestation than has historically been the case at classical recessions. Some idea of the
variations in the depth of German recessions can be gotten by examining the composite in¬
dex of coincident indicators shown in Chart II.
A word conceming our technique for selecting turning points in growth cycies is in
order. We have a Computer program for selecting turning points in the individual com-
ponent series which was developed on the basis of the rules for turning point selection
developed over the years at the National Bureau. That these rules are sufficiently stand¬
ardized to enable their codification for the Computer suggests that along with our rehance
on judgemental elements, a good part of the process of selecting turning points is straight¬
forward. However, the program still cannot assess the imphcations of all the anomalies or
data inadequacies which might arise. We, therefore, make it a practice to review ah com-
puter-selected turns and modify some few when it seems appropriate. Next we compute the
median turn for each Cluster of turning points in individual series. The Cluster of turning
points is usually rather clear, but occasionally there is ambiguity because of the deviation
of the turn in an individual series from the pattern emerging from most of the indicators.
Finally we compute a composite index of all the coincident indicators and the program
produces a chronology of turns in this index. We then make ajudgement about the consen¬
sus emerging from all the evidence - the revised turning points in individual indicators, the
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Table 4: Leads and Lags of Individual Series at Growth Cycle Turning Points for Ger¬
many, 1951-1976 (in months)
Timing at Peaks-Lead (-) or Lag (+) in months
Date
Series
Real Disposable
Income (Q)
Real GNP(Q)
Industrial Production
Mfg. Sales Volume
Retail Trade Volume
Employment
Unempl. (Inverted)
Coincident Index
Mean
Median
Series
Starts 2/51 10/55 2/61 5/65 5/70 8/73 Mean Median
1950 -6 -2 0 0 +19 +2 0
1950 0 +7 0 +9 0 -6 +2
'
0
1950 +2 +2 +1 +7 -1 0 +2 +2
1957 -2 -4 -6 -7 -5 -5
1955 +18 +9 +4 -12 +5 +6
1951 +1 +1 +11 +5 +3 +4 +3
1950 +4 0 +10 +9 0 +5 +4
1950 0 +2 +1 -1 +6 +1 +2 +1
-1 +5 +1 +4 +5 -3 +2 +2
0 +2 0 +6 +5 -0 +2 +2
B. Timing at Troughs-Lead (-) or Lag (+) in months
Date
Series Starts 2/54 4/59 2/63 8/67 12/71 5/75 Mean Median
Real Disposable
Income (Q) 1950 +6 +10 +3 +6 -15 +2 +6
Real GNP(Q) 1950 0 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 0
Industrial Production 1950 -1 -1 0 -3 0 +2 0 0
Mfg. Sales Volume 1957 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Retail Trade Volume 1955 +11 +4 +6 -5 +4 +5
Employment 1951 -3 +1 +9 +3 +9 +6 +4 +4
Unempl. (Inverted) 1950 +6 -3 0 -3 +5 +1 +1 0
Coincident Index 1950 -29 -1 0 0 +7 +3 -3 0
Mean -4 +2 +2 +1 +3 -1 +2 +2
Median „o -1 0 0 0 0 +0 0
Excluding the turn in 2/54 which has no comparable turn in the leading index.
Source: Appendix Table 1
120
C
h
a
r
t
L
W
e
s
t
G
e
r
m
a
n
G
r
o
w
t
h
Cy
ci
es
,
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
o
f
R
o
u
g
h
l
y
C
o
i
n
c
i
d
e
n
t
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
In
de
x,
1
9
5
0
-
1
9
7
8
1
9
5
0
':
>1
T
5
2
'
5
3
'
5
4
^
5
5
r
5
6
S
o
u
r
c
e
A
p
p
f
c
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
1
.
'
5
7
'
5
3
'
5
0
r
S
Ö
^
1
'
6
2
'
C
3
6
«
*6
,
C
G
'
6
7
'
6
8
'
6
9
'
7
0
'
7
1
~
2
'
7
3
'
«
7
4
'
7
5
'
7
6
Chart II: Germany, Leading vs. Coincident Composite Indexes, 1950-1978
*5 H
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median of these turns, and the turns in the composite index. In this way we decide upon a
growth cycle chronology. It is important to note that at no time is the leading indicator
composite index or any of its component series consulted in the process ofestabhshing the
growth cycle chronology.
In assessing the twelve growth cycle turns for Germany which have been selected, it is in-
structive to consider the cases in which the evidence has suggested a change of more than a
month or two from the Computer selected turns in the composite index of coincident in¬
dicators. There are seven turns which coincide with the turns in the composite index or
deviate by but one month - the peaks in 1951, 1961, 1965, and 1973; the troughs in 1959,
1963, and in 1967. The turns which deviate from the turns in the coincident index by two
months or more inciude the peaks in 1955 and 1970, and the troughs in 1954, 1971, and
1975. It is useful to consider the behavior of the composite index at each of these turning
points (see Chart II).
At the trough in 1954 the coincident index actually presents two troughs with a period of
irregulär growth in between. The first is in 1952, the second in 1954, with the latter only
slightly less deep than the former. The 1971 trough is another in which the composite index
of coincident indicators shows a double trough. A number of the components turn in the
month selected (see Chart I) and there is, as noted, some support for this choice even in the
composite index. The 1975 trough deviates from the trough in the coincident index by but
three months. The coincident index does not reflect any ambiguity in this period, but there
is considerable dispersion about the trough as is indicated in ChartL The composite index
subsumes but does not necessarily reflect such dispersion, and it is for this reason, among
others, that choosing an appropriate growth cycle chronology has not been left entirely to
the turning points reflected in the coincident index. As a rule, we try to select turning dates
that correspond to a turn in at least one of the individual series used in the selection process,
since that represents an actual estimate of activity. Moreover, although quarterly series are
dated in the mid-month of the quarter, we recognize that that is an arbitrary Convention
and give more weight to the monthly series in choosing the monthly date.
There are two turns in which the selected peaks differ from peaks in the coincident index
by more than one month - 1955 and 1970. In 1955, the discrepancy is minor - two months
- and can be explained by the existence of a double peak, the earlier one conforming to our
final selection. The difference is six months at the 1970 peak, with the selected turn leading
the composite index. Again there is considerable weakening in the index prior to its peak,
with a secondary peak coinciding with the reference peak. Once again the record among
the indicators reflects dispersion.
In sum, the selection ofan appropriate chronology involves balancing conflicting eviden¬
ce, but the final growth cycle chronology for the Federal Republic, we feel, represents effec¬
tively the consensus of the data on production, employment, income and trade.
Assessing the Behavior of Individual Indicators
We have already commented on the overall conformity of the individual indicators utilized
in determining the growth cycle chronology for West Germany. It is useful, however, to
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consider the specific timing of the several indicators at the selected growth cycle turning
points (see Table 4). Our original determination of what series to inciude in the "roughly
coincident group" emanated from the National Bureau's perspective on business cycies as
fluctuations in "aggregate economic activity". Customarily this is interpreted to mean inco¬
me, output and employment, with additional attention paid to measures closely bound to
these aggregates such as sales and trade.
As our work has progressed it has become increasingly apparent that employment, and
less often, unemployment (inverted) tend to lag growth cycle turning points. This has been
the case in our earher work for ah countries with only a few exceptions. Sometimes the lags
are not long, and occasionally there is an average lead. But overwhelmingly at growth cycle
turns one discovers that the employment series lag. The explanation offered in a number of
countries - namely that entrepreneurs prefer marginal employment adjustments (e.g.,
changing the average work week) before making major aggregate adjustments in employ¬
ment levels, would appear to be a reasonable explanation. Table 4 suggests that this tenden¬
cy to lag has persisted in this most recent study of West German growth cycies.
Real disposable income in the Federal Repubhc has been one ofthe most persistent series
in tending to deviate (in both directions), sometimes by a long time, from the growth cycle
consensus turn in most other roughly coincident indicators. Why this should be the case is
not immediately clear but suggests itself as a useful topic for future research.
Manufacturing sales volume tends to lead at peaks, but not at troughs. Retail trade
appears fairly consistently to have lagged at growth cycle turning points, suggesting, per¬
haps, that Germans in common with many others attempt to maintain purchasing levels for
as long as seems feasible after a growth cycle peak. There is also some evidence that sales
do not pick up until sometime after a trough. Most ofthe other series shown in Table 4 con¬
form reasonably to the selected growth cycle turning points.
Growth Cycle Chronologies - A Four Country Comparison
Using methods and data similar to those just described, the International Economic In¬
dicators project has recentiy produced chronologies for four countries - the United States,
West Germany, France, and Italy. There has, of course, long been much interest in whether
one country consistently leads at peaks, both classical and growth. Similarly, whether
economic revival occurs first in any one country with any consistency has attracted con¬
siderable speculation.
Table 5 presents the four chronologies and the results of turning point comparisons. In
the case of Germany, there is a good deal of Variation at individual growth cycle turns, vis-
a-vis the United States, but on balance the leads offset the lags with the result that the
average turn is close to the U.S. pattern. Both Italy and France present lags at most turning
points, both at peaks and troughs. In general, the pattern of growth cycle chronologies for
France and Italy are more closely parallel than either country is with Germany (see Chart
IIIf PartA). In earher work on the IEI project, we concluded that there was httle consistent
evidence to suggest that the United States led other countries down at peaks. The evidence
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was stronger that the United States leads other countries at troughs4. At that time we were
working with a somewhat different list of countries.
In examining the chronologies of Table 5, there is httle reason to argue on economic
grounds that the United States would lead France and Italy at either growth peaks, or
troughs, but not Germany. Nonetheless, this is the picture emerging from the Table.
In any case, attention is increasingly focussed on both real changes and on inflation rate
changes. Both are involved in the international transmission of cyclical disturbance. It is
useful, therefore, now that it is possible to do so, to examine the inflation rate cycies
separately.
We have chosen to measure inflation rates by examining the movements in the consumer
price index for each of the four countries. The results are shown in Chart IIIt Part B5.
Chart III suggests that there have been a number of cycies in inflation rates as weh as
in real growth rates in ah these countries. The United States has had more inflation cycies
just as it has had more cycies in real rates during the comparable periods covered than is
the case in any of the other countries. While there is usually a cycle in inflation rates corre¬
sponding to growth cycies this is not invariably the case. The United States skipped an in¬
flation cycle during the growth cycle of 1962-64. France skipped an inflation cycle during
the 1956-66 growth cycle. Italy skipped an inflation cycle corresponding to the 1965-72
growth cycle. West Germany skipped an inflation rate cycle in connection with the growth
cycle in 1970-1971. Despite these exceptions, the correspondence between growth cycies
and inflation rate cycies is pronounced in ah four countries. Indeed, none of these countries
experienced a cyclical decline in inflation without also experiencing, at about the same time,
a slowdown in real growth.
We shall turn our attention to the relationship between real growth cycies and inflation
rate cycies in each country shortly, but before doing so it is useful to compare the timing of
the turns in the inflation rate cycies in the other countries to the turns in the U.S. inflation
rate cycies. In this way we may compare the inflation rate changes among the four coun¬
tries in parallel manner to the real comparisons shown in Table 5. The evidence is shown in
Table 6. It is clear only that the relationships are ambiguous. If it is difficult to argue con¬
vincingly that any one country consistently leads other countries into or out ofreal growth
cycies it is equally difficult to prove that inflation rates move earlier in one country than
another. On economic grounds one might argue that the Common Market countries would
influence each others' inflation rates more closely than any would be influenced by U.S. in¬
flation rates. The evidence does not support this notion very strongly either.
4 See Philip A. Klein, Business Cycies in the Postwar World: Some Reflections on Recent Research, American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C, 1976.
5 Specifically, we have measured the percentage change in the consumer price index for the current month and
the average monthly value of the CPI for a twelve month period ending six months earlier. The result is not un-
like the well-known method of measuring the percent change from the same month a year ago, except that the
technique used here places less weight on a single month in the past and hence the rate is much less afFected by
erratic factors in that month, The rates are dated according to the terminal month ofthe comparison. For some
purposes (see below) they should be centered six months earlier.
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Inflation Rate Cycies Versus Real Growth Cycies in Four Countries
The relationship between inflation rate cycies and growth cycies in the United States, West
Germany, France and Italy can be seen in Chart III (A & B). Table 7 shows the precise tim¬
ing comparisons. In all four countries inflation rates have abated only during periods when
real economic growth has slowed or turned negative, and hkewise, during periods of rapid
real growth one always finds associated acceleration in inflation rates. In order to avoid an
arbitrary bias in measuring the leads and lags, in Table 7 we date the inflation cycies ac¬
cording to the central month of the twelve month span covered by the rates. We find some
tendency for the inflation rates to lag behind growth cycle turns in the United States, es¬
peciaUy in recent cycies. In Germany lags predominate at peaks, while in France and Italy
the inflation rate has rarely lagged behind the growth cycle turns. Taking ah four countries
together, there are virtually as many leads as lags. The imphcations ofthese findings for the
comphcated pohcy questions facing ah these countries are of some importance. Is it possi¬
ble to slow inflation rates without slowing real economic growth? The evidence of Table 7
does not support an affirmative answer to this question, in any of the countries covered.
If this conclusion seems somewhat gloomy, it is nonetheless in line with a theory
developed many years ago by Wesley Clair Mitchell6.
Geoffrey H.Moore recentiy summarized the theory as follows:
"... a prolonged period of prosperity tends to generate inefficiencies in a private enterprise
economy. They arise partly from the reactions of workers to the better employment opportunities,
wages, and fringe benefits with which they are faced, and partly from the reactions of business enter¬
prises to their own prospects and opportunities. The growth ofthese inefficiencies reduces productivi¬
ty, raises costs, and the higher costs get reflected in prices. In the initial states ofa cyclical expansion
prices usually rise faster than costs, but after a time the rise in prices is not sufficient to cover the rise
in costs in industry generally, and profit margins decline in many industries. This is an important fac¬
tor reducing incentives to invest, and increasing the chances of recession, as firms seek to cut costs.
Nevertheless, a recession, even a mild one, sets in motion forces that tend to eliminate the production
inefficiencies that developed during prosperity, and to lower the rate of inflation. Some of these
results begin to appear during the recession, others become evident only during the ensuing re¬
covery"7.
It is clear, therefore, that the Mitchell hypothesis would explain why a dechne in inflation
rates might occur only with an associated decline in real growth and why inflation rates can
be expected to accelerate along with expansion in real growth. Because leading indicators
are useful in forecasting growth cycle turns, they should also be useful in forecasting the
turns in inflation rates. The next two sections turn to these important questions.
The theory was developed in his 1913 book, Business Cycies. A revised version was published as Businesss
Cycies and Their Causes, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1959. The relevant discussion
appears in Chapter 5.
Geoffrey H. Moore, Productivity, Costs, and Prices: New Lightfrom an Old Hypothesis, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Explorations in Economic Research, Vol.2, No. I, Winter 1975, pp. 1-2.
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Leading Indicators and Growth Cycies
We have previously noted that the growth cycle turning points can be forecast with some
fidehty by means of a composite index of leading indicators (see Chart II). A graphic way
to summarize the behavior of the leading indicators vis d vis the coincident indicators is to
compare the two composite indexes as is possible in Chart II. The evidence is summarized
in Table 8. There are four peaks which can be compared. The leading index turns one
month after the coincident index at the 1965 peak. The leading index leads both the growth
peak and the coincident index at each of the other three peaks. At the five troughs the
leading index leads the growth cycle trough in every case except 1963 (a two month lag),
and 1975 (when it is coincident). The leading index leads the coincident index in every case
except the 1963 trough.
If we compare the behavior of individual coincident indicators with this pattern (see
Appendix Table 1) we find very few cases in which at any turn a coincident indicator
produces a turning point which precedes rather than follows the associated turn in the
leading index. At peaks there are four exceptions (two small leads and two coincidences); at
troughs there are nine (five in 1963). If we compare the average behavior at all turns of the
leading and coincident index (Table 8), we see that for both groups of turns the leading in¬
dex precedes the coincident index by about six months. It would seem, therefore, that the
chronology performs reasonably well in terms of the expectations carried over from prior
analyses with chronologies and indicators in the United States.
Forecasting Changes in Growth Cycies and in Inflation Rates
We have just seen that inflation rate cycies are associated with turns in real growth cycies in
the countries we have covered. It ought, therefore to be possible to forecast turns in infla¬
tion rate cycies by using composite leading indexes to do so. We can test this hypothesis
with the German data presented previously.
Table 9 presents the relevant data. Unfortunately, the composite index of leading in¬
dicators begins only in 1957, and therefore, we can make no study ofthe first three German
growth cycies. For the three peaks there is no exception to the lead and the average lead is
about a year. At troughs rough coincidence is the rule. It will be remembered (Table 8) that
at troughs the average lead of the leading index was three months while the coincident index
showed a two month lag. This means that the value of the leading index is even more
pronounced in forecasting inflation rate cycies than it was in forecasting turns in growth
cycies (Table 8). It is true that there are occasions when the turns in the leading index are
not matched by inflation rate turns. In this connection the fact that as ofthis writing the last
turn in the leading index was a trough nearly twelve months ago, suggests that a significant
inflation rate increase in the Federal Republic has been avoided already for a longer time
than at any other similar period covered by our evidence in the past twenty years.
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Table 8: Timing of Leading and Coincident Composite Indexes
of German Growth Cycle Turns, 1951-1976
Lead (-) or Lag (+) Leading Incex
At Growth Turns of vs.
Growth Leading Coincident Coincident Index
Cycle Index Index Lead (-) or Lag (+)
Turns (Months) (Months) (Months)
At Peaks (1) (2) (3)
2/51 0
10/55 +2
2/61 -6 +1 -7
5/65 0 -1 +1
5/70 -6 +6 -12
8/73 -7 +1 -8
Mean -5 +2 -6l
Timing
At Troughs
2/54 -29
4/59 -2 -1 -1
2/63 +2 0 +2
8/67 -4 .0 -4
12/71 -10 +7 -17
5/75 0 +3 -3
Mean -3 +2 -5
Timing
1. Inconsistent with the difference between columns 1 and 2
because of rounding.
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Conclusions
This study of real growth cycies in postwar Germany and the related inflation experience
confirms anew the usefulness of developing quantitative indicators for forecasting growth
cycies, and suggests importantiy that there are considerable gains in tracing both real and
inflation changes. In the case of Germany, the usefulness ofa leading index for growth cy¬
cle turning points is increased when it is seen that the leading index can also anticipate
downturns in inflation rates. It is hoped that we wül be able to make further progress in
tracing the transmission of cyclical disturbances internationally by comparing growth
cycies and inflation rate fluctuations in comparable fashion in other market-oriented
economies. We can then study the transmission mechanisms for both types of disturbance
individually as well as in combination. Table 10 illustrates the possibilities ofsuch research,
by relating the average timing ofreal growth cycies in Germany, France, and Italy to those
Table 10: Growth Cycle Turns and Inflation Rate Turns: Average Timing in Three Coun¬
tries vis-a-vis the United States, 1950-1978
Lead (-) or Lag <+) (in months)
At U.S. Peaks in At U.S. Troughs in
Country
Inflation
Growth Rate
Cycies Cycies
Inflation
Growth Rate
Cycies Cycies
West Germany -3 o -1 -1
France +11 -10 +9 -4
Italy +9 -15 +12 +3
Ttote: The Foreign turns in growth cycies are compared
to the turns in the United States growth cycies* The
foreign inflation rate cycies are compared to the turns
in the United States,inflation rate cycies.
Source: Appendix Table 2 and 3*
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in the U.S., and the average timing of inflation rate cycies in the other three countries to
U.S. inflation rate turns. It is interesting to note that German peaks in real activity typically
turn before U.S. peaks, but the inflation rates turn down virtually together. In the case of
the other two countries real activity reaches both peaks and troughs after U.S. real activity
but inflation rate cycies typically turn before U.S. inflation rate cycies. These findings are
implicit in the findings of Tables 5 and 6, but as presented in Table 10 the essential com¬
plexity of the relationships is underscored. As of our present knowledge, it is simply im¬
possible to reach any simplistic conclusions conceming the international direction taken by
either inflation rate cycies or fluctuations in real activity as they affect economic activity in
modern market-oriented economies. But the questions for future research could ap~
propriately begin with more detailed analysis of this sort of evidence.
Summary: Postwar Growth Cycies in the German Economy
The acceleration of inflation in many industrialized market-oriented economies in recent
years has increased the importance of distinguishing between real and nominal changes
when monitoring growth cycies. We have, accordingly, begun to date growth cycle turning
points at the National Bureau after deflating any component series used to determine
growth cycies which is expressed in nominal terms. While inflation rates in Germany have
been less severe in recent years than in some other countries, we have found that deflation is
nonetheless important in examining German growth cycies just as it is in economies with
more rapid inflation rates. We have produced a new deflated growth cycle chronology for
the German economy covering the past quarter of a Century.
The paper considers the behavior of seven coincident indicators at the selected growth
cycle peaks and troughs. Except for median lags at two of the peaks of five and six months,
respectively, the selected reference turns reflect with considerable fidehty the behavior of
the component measures of aggregate economic activity.
Because inflation rates appear themselves to be cyclically sensitive, we have related tums
in the German inflation rate to growth cycle turns and have found corresponding turns at
each growth recession save the 1970-1971 recession. We have found that the inflation rates
turn down weh after the growth peaks, and up weh after the growth troughs. That is, infla¬
tion rates reflect real growth cycle phases in Germany, but with a lag. These tums in infla¬
tion rates, however, can be anticipated with considerable fidehty by associating them with
the turns in a composite index of leading indicators for the Federal Republic.
Another possible use of the deflated chronology would be to apply it to studying the
international transmission of cyclical instability. There has been much interest in this and it
would be useful to try to distinguish the transmission of real disturbances from inflation
rates. We have, in this connection compared the timing of the peaks and troughs in West
German deflated growth cycies with those of the U.S., Italy, and France. In general, West
German tums appear roughly coincident with those in the U.S., although there are both
long leads and long lags, while those in Italy and France mostly lag those in the other two
countries. If the comparison is to changes in inflation rates, West German inflation rates
turn at about the same time as U.S. inflation rates, whereas France leads the U.S. inflation
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rate changes at both peaks and troughs, and Italy leads at peaks but lags at troughs. The
comparisons suggest that difTerentiating real from nominal changes in studying the interna¬
tional transmission ofinstabihty is a useful adjunct to other Steps in our attempts to unravel
this complex process.
Zusammenfassung: Wachstumszyklen in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD)
Die Beschleunigung inflationärer Entwicklungen in vielen marktwirtschafthch orientierten
Industrieländern während der letzten Jahre läßt es zunehmend wichtiger erscheinen, bei der
Beobachtung von Wachstumszyklen reale von nominalen Veränderungen zu unterschei¬
den. Deshalb haben wir begonnen, die Wendepunkte von Wachstumszyklen erst nach einer
Deflationierung nominaler (in Geldeinheiten ausgedrückter) Zeitreihen zu datieren. In der
BRD waren die Inflationsraten in letzter Zeit niedriger als in einigen anderen Volkswirt¬
schaften. Dennoch hat sich die Deflationierung bei der Analyse der bundesdeutschen
Wachstumszyklen als ebenso bedeutsam erwiesen wie im FaU von Ländern mit höherer
Inflationsrate. Wir haben eine neue Wendepunkt-Chronologie deflationierter Wachstums¬
zyklen für die BRD erstellt, die das zurückhegende Vierteljahrhundert abdeckt.
Im vorhegenden Beitrag wird das Verhalten von sieben Indikatoren der durchschnittli¬
chen Konjunkturbewegung („coincident indicators") an den oberen und unteren Wende¬
punkten der Wachstumszyklen untersucht. Abgesehen von fünf- bzw. sechsmonatigen
Verzögerungen („lags") an zwei oberen Wendepunkten spiegelt die zykhsche Bewegung
der als Bezugsgrößen ausgewählten Reihen die dadurch indizierten Schwankungen der ge¬
samtwirtschaftlichen Aktivität mit ausreichender Sicherheit.
Da die Inflationsraten ihrerseits konjunktursensibel zu sein scheinen, beobachten wir
Zusammenhänge zwischen den Wendepunkten der deutschen Inflationsrate einerseits und
denjenigen der Wachstumszyklen andererseits. Auch die Abschwungsphasen entsprechen
sich - mit Ausnahme der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Rezession 1970/71. Die Inflationsrate
nimmt stets einige Zeit nach dem Überschreiten des oberen konjunktureUen Wendepunkts
ab und steigt nach dem unteren Wendepunkt wieder an. Das heißt, die Zyklen der Infla¬
tionsrate spiegeln die realen Wachstumszyklen der BRD, allerdings mit einer gewissen Ver¬
zögerung. Die Wendepunkte der Inflationsrate können insofern im deutschen FaU mit hin¬
reichender Zuverlässigkeit prognostiziert werden, wenn man sich dazu eines komplexen In¬
dexes bedient, der aus Frühindikatoren („leading indicators") der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
(realen) Konjunktur gebüdet wird.
Mit Hilfe der deflationierten Wendepunkt-Chronologie kann auch die internationale
Übertragung von konjunktureUer Instabihtät untersucht werden. Dieser Punkt verdient
großes Interesse, deshalb erschien es nützhch, zwischen der Übertragung realer Wachs¬
tumsstörungen und derjenigen inflationärer Impulse zu unterscheiden. Zu diesem Zweck
haben wir die Datierung von oberen und unteren Wendepunkten deflationierter Wachs¬
tumszyklen in der BRD, in den USA, in Italien und Frankreich miteinander verglichen. Im
aUgemeinen stimmen die bundesdeutschen Wendepunkte grob mit denen der USA überein,
wenn auch gelegentlich sowohl größere zeithche Vorspriinge („leads") als auch Verzöge-
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rungen („lags") auftreten. Dagegen sind die Wachstumszyklen in Itahen und Frankreich
zeitlich im Verhältnis zu denen der beiden anderen Länder meist verzögert.
Vergleicht man nun die Veränderungen der Inflationsraten, zeigt sich, daß diese in der
BRD und in den USA annähernd gleichzeitig stattfinden, während die Inflationsrate
Frankreichs früher als die der USA sowohl an den oberen wie an den unteren Wendepunk¬
ten reagiert, die Italiens nur an oberen Wendepunkten, dagegen mit einem Lag an den unte¬
ren. Die Vergleiche legen den Schluß nahe, daß die Unterscheidung von realen und nomina¬
len Veränderungen bei der Untersuchung internationaler konjunktureUer Übertragungs¬
vorgänge einen fruchtbaren Beitrag zu weiteren Bemühungen darsteUt, diesen komplexen
Prozeß aufzuklären.
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Appendix Table 2: Timing of Turns in Growth Cycle Chronologies for Three Countries at
United States Peaks and Troughs (Lead (-) or Lag (+), in months)
West Germany
France
Italy
2/57
-16
+9
-4
United States Growth Cycle Peaks
2/60 5/62 6/66 3/69 3/73
* -13 +14 +5
+21 0 +8 +16
+16 — +11 +13
Mean +11 +11
United States Growth Cycle Troughs
4/58 2/61 10/64 10/67 11/70 3/75
West Germany +12 -20 -2 +13 +2
France +18 — +8 +7 +9 +3
Italy +15 — +5 — +21 +5
Mean +15 -2 +2 +14 +3
*Crosses opposite turn.
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Appendix Table 3: Timing ofTums in Inflation Rate Cycies for Three Countries at United
States Peaks and Troughs (Lead (-) or Lag (+) in months)
United States Inflation Rate Cycle Peaks
2/51 10/53 3/58 5/60 10/66 5/70 12/74
West Germany +9 +2 -6 -7
France +12 +1 -51 -12 -2
Italy +4 -23 -39 -1
Mean +8 -7 -32 -3
United States Inflation Rate Cycle Troughs
1/50 5/53 1/55 5/59 1/62 5/67 8/62 12/76
West Germany +4 —— -16 0 +7 ...
France +6 -7 +2 -17
Italy +2 +4 +2 +18 -11
Mean +2 +2 -16 +1 +9
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